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Abstract: This paper briefly discusses the rise of the Mahmudiyya in 
post-Soviet Daghestan, and the political strategies of its leading authority, 
Shaykh Said-Afandi Chirkeevskii (Atsaev, 1937-2012). How did the 
Said-Afandi’s Mahmudiyya branch of the Naqshbandiyya khalidiyya Sufi 
brotherhood become a state-supporting and state-supported institution 
in contemporary Daghestan? I argue that key elements of Said-Afandi’s 
rise into the spotlight were his take-over of the republican Muftiate in 
the period when the old Soviet Muftiate for the North Caucasus was 
disintegrating, and the subsequent establishment of a network of Islamic 
teaching institutes that reached out to both Kumyks and Avars. Here 
the Mahmudiyya competes with another Khalidiyya branch and especially 
with the Salafi groups; the latter now appear as the major threat to the 
secular and multinational republic, while Said-Afandi’s propagation of a 
conservative ethos matched the general conservative stance of the 
Daghestani and Russian leaderships. Also of importance is the integration 
of Shadhiliyya elements into Mahmudiyya teaching and practice that 
make the group’s appeal more diverse. Said-Afandi’s writings (originally 
written in Avar) were professionally translated into Russian, with a broad 
Islamic discourse for the masses and a specialized Sufi discourse for the 
inner circle. With these missionary policies Said-Afandi reached out not 
only to the Daghestani nationalities but also to Muslims in other parts 
of the Russian Federation, from Moscow over Tatarstan to Siberia. At 
the same not only the Salafi challenge but also the ethnic cleavages in 
Daghestan itself pose serious limitations to the Mahmudiyya success, 	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and the question remains whether the current leadership of the 
brotherhood – after Said-Afandi’s tragic death at the hands of a female 
suicide bomber in the summer of 2012 – will be able to hold the group 
together. 
Key words: Said-Afandi Chirkeevskii, Mahmudiyya, Naqshbandiyya 
khalidiyya, Sufism in Daghestan. 
 
In this paper I would like to discuss the phenomenon of Shaykh Said-
Afandi Chirkeevskii (Atsaev, born 1937, assassinated 28 August 2012), 
who was Daghestan’s (and probably Russia’s) foremost Sufi master. What 
made his Naqshbandiyya khalidiyya mahmudiyya Sufi branch so popular 
in Daghestan and beyond? My argument is that the rise of the 
Mahmudiyya starting in the late 1980s was based on a mix of Sufi and 
political strategies; the first made his teachings popular with a large part of 
the Muslim population, and the second made him acceptable to the post-
Soviet governments in Makhachkala (the capital of the Republic of 
Daghestan in the Russian Federation) and Moscow, and allowed him to 
develop the necessary economic assets to establish Mahmudiyya media 
(esp. books and newspapers), and to get a firm hold on the existing Islamic 
institutions in Daghestan, including the SpirituSpiritual Administration of 
Daghestan’s Muslims (i.e., the Muftiate), the Council of Islamic Scholars, 
several Islamic teaching institutes, and many mosques. Challenges to his 
“Sufi empire” came, on the one hand, from the rising tide of Salafis, 
including the underground cells that continue to terrorize state and society, 
and on the other hand from other Sufi groups, with whom Said-Afandi 
engaged in polemics on Sufi legitimacy (esp. over silsilas and rituals). 
Finally, also the ethnic diversity in Daghestan limited his outreach; he 
became most popular among some parts of two of the largest ethnic 
groups of the country, the Avars and Kumyks, but also among these 
nationalities alternative Islamic groups are present. 
 
 
The Naqshbandiyya in Daghestan and Jihad 
 
The Naqshbandiyya khalidiyya mahmudiyya (in the following: 
Mahmudiyya) goes back to the teachings of Mahmud al-Almali (d. 1877), 
a Daghestani shaykh from the village of Almalo in what is today Northern 
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Azerbaijan1. The Mahmudiyya emerged after the famous Great Caucasus 
War, as an offshoot of the Naqshbandiyya khalidiyya (in the following: 
Khalidiyya), some leading shaykhs of which had been associated with the 
jihad of the three Daghestani Imams (Ghazi Muhammad, Hamzat, and 
Shamil), which lasted from 1828 to 1859. By contrast, Mahmud and his 
followers are said to have rejected the idea of jihad against the Russian 
conquest, which they regarded as futile. In fact, the new Mahmudiyya branch 
seems to have stepped into the niche that opened up when many Khalidyya 
shaykhs of the jihad period had perished during the war or were sent into 
exile.  
Still, it was rather slowly that the Mahmudiyya gained adherents in 
some villages of Avaria and in the northern plains of Daghestan. The most 
important authorities of the Mahmudiyya were the versatile Sufi shaykh, 
local Islamic judge, medical doctor, and Jadid thinker Sayfallah-Qadi 
Bashlarov (d. in 1919 when Denikin’s White Army entered Temir-Khan 
Shura [today Buinaksk])2, and his disciple Hasan al-Qahi (d. 1937) from 
the Avar village of Kakhib.  
Sayfallah-Qadi Bashlarov (obviously through contacts that he 
established during a period of exile in the Volga region) is particularly 
important because he introduced the Shadhiliyya Sufi brotherhood to 
Daghestan. The Shadhiliyya affiliation did not supplant the Naqshbandiyya 
(khalidiyya) mahmudiyya but united with it, in a curious combination: 
since Bashlarov’s time the Daghestani Mahmudiyya shaykhs use to teach 
Shadhiliyya practices (including the “loud”, vocal dhikr) to the beginners 
on the Sufi path, as a kind of propedeuticum, and only when a murid has 
progressed on that path to a certain level he is initiated into the practices 
of the Mahmudiyya (including the techniques characteristic for the 
Khalidiyya, esp. the silent dhikr, the rabita and the muraqaba). The 
Shadhiliyya, with its easy and impressive “populist” rituals, is thus meant 
to attract the masses, while the Naqshbandiyya mahmudiyya techniques 
are reserved for the chosen few [Kemper, 2002]3. 
In the Soviet period both branches of the Naqshbandiyya, the 
“older” Khalidiyya and the “newer” Mahmudiyya, suffered immensely 
from political repression (Mahmudiyya master Hasan al-Qahi, a prolific 	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writer of Sufi treatises and epistles, was executed in 1937), but both branches 
survived, and partly even expanded into areas of Daghestan where they 
had no adherents before. An important factor in this new, “Soviet” spread 
of the Naqshbandiyya were the massive resettlement campaigns of the 
1950s to 1970s when whole village communities from the mountains were 
brought to the kolkhozes in the plains; with the settlers also came the 
religiosity and the religious traditions of the mountaineers. 
Yet these movements of populations do not yet explain the rise of 
the Mahmudiyya, which in the 1970s and 1980s was still limited to some 
villages; only since the early 1990s the Mahmudiyya gained a wide spread 
in Avaria and also in the Kumyk areas of Daghestan. Here several factors 
seem to have been at work.  
The most important of these factors is that Said-Afandi Chirkeevskii (a 
disciple of several Mahmudiyya shaykhs of the Soviet period) managed to 
get a hold on the Muftiate, that is, on the state-supported Muslim Spiritual 
Administration. This happened in February 1992, when the old Soviet 
Muftiate for the North Caucasus (located in Makhachkala) disintegrated; 
with the collapse of the USSR each North Caucasus republic of the Russian 
Federation established its own Muftiate. Consequently, the Muslim Spiritual 
Administration in Makhachkala was turned into a Muftiate for Daghestan 
(DUMD, Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Daghestan). At that 
time Kumyk and Avar factions struggled for control over the new Daghestani 
Muftiate. To balance the ethnic interests, the Kumyk Bagautdin Isaev was 
elected Mufti and the Avar Magomedkhadzhi Aliev was made chairman 
of Daghestan’s Council of Alims. In January/February 1992 Aliev convened 
a meeting of the Council of Alims, in the absence of the Mufti who was 
on a trip abroad. The convention stormed the DUMD building and sealed 
it. When on 15 February the convention was continued, the Kumyk and 
Dargin imams, and some Avars, left the meeting in protest, arguing that 
one would have to wait for the return of Mufti Isaev. The remaining 
participants were Avars, and mostly Mahmudiyya murids of Said-Afandi 
Chirkeevskii. They announced to convene a Conference of the Muslims of 
Daghestan, which indeed took place on 29 February 1992 but was not 
attended by the Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Tabasaranis and Laks, and by 
a part of the Avar imams. The conference (in Makhachkala’s Russian Drama 
theatre), attended by more than 150 delegates, elected Abdurakhimkhadzhi 
Magomedov (the director of a new madrasa in Sositli, Khasaviurt region) 
as chairman of the Council of Alims, and asked the Council to elect a new 
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Mufti. The first Council meeting then took place on 2 March 1992, and 
led to the election of Said-Akhmedkhadzhi Darbishgadzhiev (an Avar 
from Mekhel’ta who lived in Endirei, Khasaviurt raion) to the position of 
Daghestan’s Mufti. 
This chain of events thus resulted in an Avar takeover of DUMD, 
and it put the disciples of Said-Afandi into key positions. This in turn 
triggered the establishment of other national muftiates in Daghestan. On 
12 March 1993 the Laks established their “Society for the Support of the 
Spiritual Renaissance of the Lak People”, led by Gasan Gasanov, a medical 
doctor from Buinaksk. On 25 April a conference of the Kumyk people 
resulted in the establishment of a Kumyk Spiritual Administration of the 
Muslims of Daghestan (KDUMD), headed by former DUMD Mufti Isaev. 
A year later the Dargins followed with a Dargin DUMD, and elected 
Abdulla-Khadzhi Aligadzhiev as Mufti. Finally, by the end of 1993 a 
Conference of the Muslims of South Daghestan (mainly Lezgis) elected 
Mavledin Latinov as their Mufti, who had been imam in the town of 
Dagestanskie Ogni. 
In September 1994 the Daghestani government attempted to unite 
all of these “ethnic” Daghestani Spiritual Administrations under DUMD. This 
plan envisaged that the four newly-emerged national Muftis would henceforth 
be regarded as deputies of the (“central”, yet in fact Avar) DUMD. This 
agreement was however not implemented; instead, DUMD continued to 
be dominated by Avars, mainly by murids of Said-Afandi [Kemper and 
Shihaliev, 2012]. With other words, it is inter-ethnic competition that 
propelled Said-Afandi to political and religious positions of power. 
A second important factor leading to the rise of Said-Afandi to 
republican prominence was that he managed to make inroads into the Kumyk 
camp. In particular, Said-Afandi found an effective deputy in the Kumyk 
Arslanali Gamzatov, a well-known scholar and a charismatic speaker who 
boosted the spread of the tariqa among the Kumyks in the Buinaksk area. 
Buinaksk is also close to Said-Afandi’s birthplace Chirkei (in Avaria), and 
in the mid-1990s Gamzatov directed the new Saifullah-Qadi Islamic 
University in Buinaksk, which produced a lot of graduates-murids. After 
the establishment of the “Avar” Muslim Spiritual Administration of 
Daghestan the Buinaksk Friday mosque became the center for the spread 
of the Mahmudiyya in the city, and the mosques in the area around 
Buinaksk were almost all equipped with imams from the Mahmudiyya, 
who had been educated by Gamzatov. By contrast, the Mahmudiyya has 
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not too many adherents among the Kumyks in the North of Daghestan 
(Khasaviurt and Babaiurt raions); here the “old” Khalidiyya branch of the 
Naqshbandiyya as well as Salafi groups enjoy more support. The Northern 
Kumyks, as well as those of Karabudakhkent region (where the Khalidiyya 
has traditionally been strong) often regard Arslanali Gamzatov as a 
“traitor” to the Kumyk cause who went over to the Avar side; the background 
is that the Kumyk Gamzatov had previously been a murid of the Kumyk 
shaykh Muhammad-Amin Gadzhiev of Paraul, who represented the 
Khalidiyya.  
According to the academic Arabist Shamil Shikhaliev (Makhachkala / 
Bochum), the question where Kumyks do or do not accept the Mahmudiyya 
has to do with where they have traditionally been in conflict with the 
Avars. In the Buinaksk region relations between the two nationalities were 
relatively good, since there had been no resettlement campaigns in this 
area, so that the autochthonous Kumyks did not regard the Avars as a 
threat, and did not have grievances against them; by contrast, the northern 
Kumyks prefer to follow Dargin Khalidiyya shaykhs or Salafism, to 
distinguish themselves from the Avars who were settled in the North in 
the seventies, many of whom “brought with them” their Khalidiyya 
affiliation from their home areas in the mountains. At the same time the 
Mahmudiyya also spread in the very north of Daghestan, in the Noghai 
steppe territories; this development results from the circumstance that 
many Noghai students (and a few Kumyks from the North) studied at 
Gamzatov’s Islamic University in Buinaksk. The distribution of the two 
competing Naqshbandiyya branches is thus very much linked to the ethnic 
relations that resulted from Soviet agricultural resettlement policies.  
Ethnic fragmentation also came to characterize the inner structure 
of the Mahmudiyya, with competing shaykhs of local influence in various 
villages. In general, Kumyk shaykhs largely attract Kumyk disciples and 
remain at distance from Avar shaykhs of the same branch of the brotherhood. 
Differences between these “ethnic” groups of the Mahmudiyya are reflected 
in the ornament of the embroidered skullcaps of the men, which vary from 
village to village and thereby reflect the different Mahmudiyya identities 
related to the local shaykhs. Said-Afandi, in recent years increasingly 
fragile, seemed to hold this complex Sufi structure together through his 
charisma and authority. Interesting is that Said-Afandi also gained followers 
in other parts of the Russian Federation; we know of at least one case 
from Western Siberia where the whole male population of a Siberian Tatar 
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village “converted” to Said-Afandi’s Mahmudiyya, although the personal 
links with Said-Afandi seem to have been minimal or even absent. In this 
case the acceptance of the Mahmudiyya teachings and of its line of 
transmission from faraway Daghestan have a very different meaning, in a 
very different context1. 
 
 
The Mahmudiyya under Said-Afandi 
 
Today the quasi-official “Islamic establishment” of Daghestan, 
especially the Council of Islamic Scholars (Sovet ulemov) and the Muftiate 
(Daghestan’s Muslim Spiritual Administration) in Makhachkala, but also the 
directors and teachers of most of the ten or twelve Islamic teaching institutes 
in the country, are known to be his loyal murids [Bobrovnikov et al., 2009]. 
Under his leadership the Mahmudiyya has embarked upon a large 
project of publishing Mahmudiyya texts; among these we find very 
professional academic editions of the important scholarly works and letters 
of Bashlarov and Hasan al-Qahi (in Arabic, but partly also in Russian 
translation) that reflect the emergence of the dual Shadhili-Mahmudi 
teaching, and also a fine Arabic collection of Sufi biographies from 
Daghestan, written by Shaykh Shu‘ayb Afandi al-Bagini (d. 1912) from the 
Avar village of Baginub2. More affordable and popular are a multitude of 
brochures on individual shaykhs of the Mahmudiyya, in the Avar 
language or in Russian; these works depict the Mahmudiyya shaykhs of 
the 1900s to 1980s as if they had been the major and only Naqshbandiyya 
masters in the country of the Soviet period, and they present their alleged 
sayings as expressions of a general “wisdom of the mountains” [Gorskaia 
mudrost’…, 2009]. What we see here is a new type of post-Soviet 
hagiographies, with indications of the locations of the burial places of 
these saints. Also Said-Afandi’s own works, produced in the Avar language, 
have been professionally translated into Russian by his murids, and can be 
found in many bookstores not only in Daghestan but also in other parts of 
Russia, where Said Afandi has won new (non-Daghestani) adherents. Finally, 
also the Internet seems to play a significant role in the spread of his authority. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the case of Novoat’ialovo village, see: Bustanov, 2012. 
2 The most important of these Arabic-language publications are: al-Bagini, 1996; Mir 
Khalid Sayfallah, 1998; al-Qahi, 1998. 
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The Mahmudiyya’s rivals from the Khalidiyya branch do not seem 
to have the resources to come up with a similar series of publications, 
which means that the Mahmudiyya also dominates the Islamic book market 
in Daghestan. The conflict between the two Naqshbandiyya branches is 
largely revolving around two issues, namely the proper conduct of the 
shaykhs and their murids in private and public and the question of their 
Sufi credentials, expressed in mutual accusations of not having a correct 
silsila, that is, of not having a proper license to teach, of being a “false 
shaykh” (mutashayyikh in Arabic, which can be translated as “somebody 
who claims to be a shaykh but who has not received the respective Sufi 
education and has never obtained a full-fledged Sufi diploma [ijaza] from 
a respected shaykh”). Also within the Mahmudiyya there are divisions and 
tensions, and some of the shaykhs from Said-Afandi’s camp can act as 
Shadhiliyya shaykhs only, and are not regarded as having reached the 
higher stage of Naqshbandiyya mahmudiyya teachings. Reportedly Shaykh 
Arslanali Gamzatov, the above-mentioned director of the Sayfullah-Qadi 
Bashlarov Islamic University in Buinaksk, had at one point seen his 
Mahmudiyya license “revoked” by Said-Afandi, meaning he was humiliated 
and downgraded to the status of “only” a Shadhiliyya shaykh. Obviously 
Gamzatov was becoming too prominent in Said-Afandi’s eyes. 
The dominance of the Avar Mahmudiyya-shaykh Said-Afandi over 
the Islamic establishment in Daghestan is to a large degree also a reflectiont 
of the political system in the country, which is sometimes described as a 
form of “consociationalism”, which entails that political representation is 
largely linked to ethnic census; the underlying idea is that also the 
smallest of the twenty-five or so Daghestani ethnic groups should have 
“their” representatives in the parliament and in the administration. 
Reportedly, also the ministries and important resources are usually divided 
up between the major Daghestani nations, especially the Dargins, Avars, 
and Kumyks; the Laks, Lezgis, Azeris, Noghais and the many smaller groups 
have less of a say on republican level but have their representatives locally 
[Ware and Kisriev, 2010]. In this “deal”, the Avars – and Said-Afandi’s 
Mahmudiyya in particular – have secured for themselves control over the 
state-supported religious administration and the Islamic institutes, including 
the Islamic foundations (important for the hajj pilgrimage, mosque 
construction, publications and public events, and for business in general). 
However, attempts of the Avars to establish Avar imams also in non-Avar 
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territories (e.g in Daghestan’s South) have repeatedly led to conflict 
[Matsuzato and Ibragimov, 2005]. 
Today the biggest challenge to the status quo in Daghestan, and 
thus also to Sufism and in particular to the prominent role of the 
Mahmudiyya, is political Salafism. Since the 1990s Daghestan has been 
caught up in several waves of violence, first in connection with the events 
in Chechnya (and the emergence of the Salafi communities around the 
Lak village of Kadar, which was stormed by the army and eliminated in 
late 1999) but at present above all in the context of many “homegrown”, 
Daghestani Salafi communities (jama‘ats) in various parts of the republic. 
Dissatisfied with the miserable economy, widespread corruption and 
clientilism, many young Muslims have turned their back on the system 
and joint the “Brothers in the Forests”, that is, the militant Islamic 
underground, which is loosely connected to the (virtual) “Islamic Emirate” 
of the Chechen warlord/terrorist Dokku Umarov1. Today, violent attacks 
on policemen and officials occur in Daghestan almost on a daily basis, and 
also many public representatives of Islam have been killed by radicals (at 
least this is usually the official version), including several Muftis, Sufi 
masters, and professors of Islam.  
On 28 August 2012 also the 74-year old Said-Afandi was killed in a 
suicide terrorist attack. According to the news reports, a Russian woman 
who had converted to Islam (and who had lost her husband in the armed 
struggle) approached Said-Afandi during his sermon in his native Chirkei 
and detonated her bomb, also killing several other people. It remains to be 
seen which consequences this tragic event will have for the further 
development of the Mahmudiyya. 
Against the background of these inner-Islamic conflicts, Said-Afandi’s 
writings had a double goal: first to defend the Mahmudiyya teachings and 
the position of Said-Afandi himself vis-a-vis other Sufi groups, and 
second to denounce the Daghestani Islamic radicals as “Wahhabis”, that 
is, as puppets of foreign Islamists from the Gulf region. The latter approach is 
a central tenet of the Kremlin’s policies towards Islam, and also of Muslim 
projects of constructing a state-loyal “traditional Islam” in Russia (including 
the version that was promoted in Tatarstan by the late Valiulla Iakupov, 
who was equally assassinated by radicals in the summer of 2012) [Bustanov 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On Dokku Umarov’s Islamic discourse see: Kemper, 2012. For Salafi discourses see also: 
Knysh, 2012; and Kurbanov, 2010. 
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and Kemper, 2013]. The Mahmudiyya therefore appears, to a degree, as a 
state-supporting and state-supported version of Islam; and it is no wonder 
that Said-Afandi refrained from sharply criticizing the republican leadership 
or the Kremlin in public. In their shadow Said-Afandi had much freedom 
for popularizing his view of Islam, and for exerting, as the grey eminence, 
his influence on Daghestani Islamic affairs. 
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